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Distrust as a hazard for future sustainable mobility planning. 
Rethinking employees’ vulnerability when introducing new
information and communication technologies in Local Authorities
The implementation of innovative technologies to support the planning and 
implementation of new transport schemes in cities requires staff to not only gain 
appropriate technical capabilities, but also to have the willingness to adopt
innovative technologies. Taking a sociotechnical approach, focussing on the 
Technology-Acceptance Model (TAM), we highlight employees’ distrust and 
unwillingness to become vulnerable as additional challenge for Local Authorities 
(LAs) to cope with the introduction of new information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) for mobility solutions in their transport departments. Using
data from semi-structured interviews and workshops held across Europe 
(conducted as part of H2020 CIVITAS SUITS), two key indicators have been 
identified relating to the unwillingness of potential users to adopt new 
technologies for mobility solutions, i.e., incongruence of values and attribution of
negative motives. Furthermore, we show behavioural intentions’ that indicate that
users’ are not willing to become vulnerable and thus, provide evidence of signs  
for an organisation to look for that may show that the likelihood of their
technological implementation is relatively high. The practical guidelines
provided at the end of the paper have been derived from our experiences of
introducing new technologies for mobility solutions in partner cities of the 
SUITS project and highlight how users’ can be persuaded to ‘become vulnerable’
and actual using new technologies for future mobility solutions. 












    
 
   
 
  
                                                 
   
Introduction
The rapid developments in the field of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) have changed the mobility sector over the last few years. New mobility services 
and service providers have entered the market exploiting the possibilities offered by
innovative ICT to provide new mobility options for the users and simplify their use. 
Cities are transforming into smart cities, in which ICTs collect and process huge
amounts of data. Within the transport sector, sensor technology captures traffic flows 
and data on air pollution in real time, intelligent information and support systems 
facilitate the search for parking spaces or simplify the use of public transport and 
complementary micro-mobility services. At the same time, these systems provide data 
on travel behaviour and utilization rates that may inform the planning of future transport 
systems and more bespoke services (not always within the transport sector) Local 
Authorities (LAs) are responsible for shaping the mobility systems of their cities, and 
need to be mindful of the opportunities and risks arising from new technologies and 
data.
The implementation, integration and use of such systems presents a major 
challenge for smaller LAs. Wide scale introduction of technologies, the huge amount of 
data generated by sensor technology and its potential use in informing a widescale city
transformation, has left public sector employees threatened in a number of substantive
ways and made them feel vulnerable. When people have to cope with ICTs1, they are
not familiar with, they have to be willing to feel vulnerable as they progress along the 
learning curve. They have to develop positive expectations that this new technology will
not harm them (e.g. through redundancy or making their job harder), or their cities in 





    
      
    
   
   









   
 
the long-run (e.g. through misuse of data, unfavourable benchmarking) (e.g. Nienaber 
and Schewe, 2014) and that the technologies will lead to better outcomes for them and 
their city. On the one hand, employees have to understand how a new technology will
contribute to the goals and strategies of their business, but at the same time they need to 
realize how that technology is congruent to their own values and expectations and what 
impact it will have on their daily work.
Without such conformations, there is a high risk that employees won´t support 
fully buy into the technology, because they may be afraid, for example, that new ways 
of working will take more time and effort, that their productivity may decline while they
are learning to use the system, or that they will not be able to understand how to use it –
leading to ridicule and negative staff appraisals. In other words, they fear to become 
vulnerable. Following Chambers (2006), vulnerability is defined as exposure to 
contingencies and stress, and difficulty in coping with them since vulnerability
comprises an external side of risks, shocks and stress to which an individual is subject;
and an internal side which is defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without
damaging loss” (p. 33).
Having positive expectations towards a new technology such as urban transport 
management systems, and the willingness to become vulnerable when adopting and 
actual using it, are the key elements of trust (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Cramerer, 
1998; Nienaber, Hofeditz, and Romeike, 2015b). Trust is correspondingly the key factor 
for the actual use of new ICTs (Nienaber and Schewe, 2014). When employees are not 
willing to become vulnerable and may not share positive expectations towards a new 
technology, distrust may occur. Following Bijlsma-Frankema and colleagues (2015)
distrust is a psychological state, comprising the unwillingness to accept vulnerability, 
based on negative perceptions and expectations. 










   




    
  
Accordingly, distrust in our context is the unwillingness by potential users to 
become vulnerable and the expectation that the technology may harm them (e.g. failures 
may likely, expectation of poor benefit, etc.) or their city. Failures in transport systems 
may be catastrophic for citizens and significantly reduce the quality of life and the 
attraction of a city. In the literature distrust has been connected to a variety of negative
consequences such as a lack of cooperation (Cho, 2006), the avoidance of interaction 
(Bies and Tripp, 1996), or the unwillingness to share knowledge or information 
(Bijsma-Frankema, Weibel, and Sitkin, 2015). Distrust can therefore be conceptualised 
as an unrecognised and neglected hazard that derives from feelings of not willing to 
become vulnerable, which consequently leads to non-use of a new technology. In 
operational terms, this means that where employees are reluctant to use, or slow to 
understand technology, implementation will be delayed, or impeded, or in the worst 
case expensive systems will simply not be used. Thus, tackling distrust is crucial for 
forecasting people’s attitudes and behaviours and therefore for accepting and adopting
new ICTs (e.g. Van de Walle & Six, 2014). 
This paper is based on the authors’ experiences of trying to introduce ICT to 
small-to-medium LAs wishing to implement sustainable transport measures. It is 
believed that big, open source data collection and analysis, will lead to new insights and 
better transport planning. It is also ‘believed’ that even more benefits can be accrued by
linking up data sets across departments e.g. combining data from land use, transport, 
environmental sensing and public health and comparing data across cities. For 
traditional LAs, which may operate in quite rigid silos, interdepartmental working and 
sharing of data is a challenge in itself, even without the introduction of new ICT. 
We highlight the importance of the employees’ perspective in technology




    
    
  
   
   





    
    
  
  
    
  
     
   
acceptance, in the context of future mobility planning, using research from 
psychological and business-related scholars to re-imagines hazard and resilience as 
issues of distrust, understood via attention towards lived experiences of vulnerability. 
This approach is based on sociotechnical systems theory that recognises the importance
of behavioural change when implementing technological innovation (e.g. Cherns, 1976, 
1987; Clegg, 2000). 
The paper draws on the results from thematic multi-stage analysis of semi-
structured interviews and workshops with representatives of transport planning
departments across Europe, who are in the process of implementing new technology. 
Best practise examples will be shown of how LAs can reduce employees’ vulnerability, 
enhance their employees’ resilience and foster the implementation of new technology
Although the research takes place in the context of mobility it may be applicable to 
other departments in LAs, e.g. public health, environment and energy all of which are
facing similar problems.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Firstly, the theoretical foundation of 
vulnerability and trust in relation to technology adoption will be introduced, followed 
by a description of the negative consequences, which may result from an unwillingness 
to become vulnerable. From this, a theoretical framework will be developed based on
recent findings regarding the Technology-Acceptance Models (TAM). The thematic
multi-step analysis coding of comprehensive interview and workshop material, has 
enabled us to develop this framework by indicating behavioural intentions that may
trigger unwillingness to become vulnerable and its negative consequences. Finally, we
describe best practises in guidelines on a) how to reduce the chances of a user being
unwilling to become vulnerable and b) how to overcome this.
  
   
 
   
     
    
  
  
    
  






   






Trust and users’ vulnerability when implementing new ICTs for mobility
solutions 
The implementation of new mobility solutions adopting ICTs brings new challenges to 
small, traditional organisations, in our case in relation to future sustainable mobility
planning. Organisations have to become more effective and resilient to new ICTs and
new ways of working in order to gain the benefits they bring. However, most change
programmes focus solely on technological or/and technical change highlighting the 
importance of training and seminars to enhance employees’ abilities to cope with these
innovations, but ignore the importance of social and behavioural aspects, As such they
may end up failing (e.g. Nienaber and Schewe, 2014; Nienaber, Spundflasch, and 
Soares, 2019) or creating deep concern among employees.
In this paper, in line with Rousseau and colleagues (1998), we define trust as the 
individual willingness to be vulnerable based on positive expectations that another party
will not take advantage of this vulnerability. In relation to the implementation of new 
technology we can define trust as the individual willingness to be vulnerable based on 
positive expectations towards a new technology and its possible benefit for the 
individual. Scholars highlighted that trust consist of two components: the affective side 
called the vulnerability and the cognitive side describing the positive expectations
towards another party (Nienaber et al. 2015b). In the area of public management, we
have to consider additionally, that LAs have a commitment and responsibility to their 
city and its citizens. They may therefore have an added burden in technology adoption. 
They do not want to put their citizens at risk (e.g. from data breaches), they do not want 
their citizens to be exploited (e.g. through the selling of data), and they want the best 
possible city. 
 
   
   
  
  
   
  
  
    
  
   
    
  
 




   
  
The affective side of trust has been not well documented (see Nienaber et al., 
2015b). We believe that one of the key reasons for failures in the implementation in 
organisations is the perceived individual vulnerability when it comes to the actual use of 
the new technology. Although users of a particular technology may perceive its’ 
usefulness and also may be understand how easy its’ use might be, they are still not 
willing to use it since they are afraid of its’ consequences for themselves and their city. 
In this paper, we want to elaborate whether this affective side of trust, thus the 
vulnerability, plays a vital role here. 
In terms of sociological factors, Chambers (2006) explained vulnerability by means of
two indicators: external threats and a lack of internal coping mechanisms. When 
implementing new technology in an organisation (e.g. new financial systems, 
conference systems), external threats may relate, for example to the lack of transparency
of a potential supplier (e.g. where is the data stored, who potentially has access to it
within and externally to the organisation) or the complexity of the technological 
solution. Internal coping mechanisms relate to the final end user, who may feel 
cognitively challenged or overwhelmed by the thought of the new system and the added 
demands this may place on them. Inculcated and familiar with old ways of working and 
tacit knowledge of how things work, they may not have positive expectations about the
new technology. Also if they are viewed as or see themselves as expert user with former
system, they may be unwilling to become vulnerable when learning to use the new 
system (e.g. through loss of prestige and respect). 
Our argument, in line with sense-making theory, suggests that risky experiences 
such being in unfamiliar situations, are characterized by negative feelings in the form of
disorientation or foreignness (Louis, 1980). Following Weick and colleagues (2005), the 
key question related to sense-making is ‘same or different?’ As long as something
 
   
  




      














     
seems to be similar to something well known already, individuals perceive it as less 
risky and thus, may have positive feelings towards it (e.g. a system upgrade as opposed 
to new software environment). This means that when a new technology is implemented 
and perceived as familiar and/or can be connected to something well known, the 
implementation and actual use of the new technology is very likely. Whereas, 
something that is not known and very different from previous experiences might be 
perceived as threatening and thus, employees do not want to become vulnerable and 
accordingly may not use it. This may result in implementation failure or suboptimal use.
Distrust as negative consequence of users’ unwillingness to become vulnerable
Distrust is defined in several ways, either in contrast to trust (e.g. Lewicki and 
Tomlinson 2003), or as a distinct concept, in which it is described in terms of confident 
negative expectations and perceptions about the intentions and beliefs of another party
(Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies 1998; Lewicki, Tomlinson and Gillespie, 2006). In this 
paper, distrust is defined as a psychological state, comprising the unwillingness to 
accept vulnerability, based on pervasive negative perceptions and expectations towards 
someone or something unknown (in line with Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015). 
Research has consistently shown the negative consequences of distrust that can 
harm organisations trying to implement new technologies. One key consequence is the
avoidance of interaction with the new technology or its suppliers (Bies and Tripp, 1996;
Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004; Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015; March and Olsen, 1975). The
rationale for this is that potential users try to reduce or prevent future harm. This is 
accompanied at the organisational level by less knowledge, increased knowledge hiding
and levels of conflict (Sitkin and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2018). All these become real 
obstacles when trying to introduce new technology. The unwillingness to interact with a 








   
    
     








   
   
   
hinder implementation as employees will not adopt and use the technology as planned. 
Even worse, when some potential users perceive the technology as harmful, distrust 
may spread from one employee to another. This will lead to a distrustful climate across 
the organisation which will impede further changes or technologies (pervasiveness of 
distrust, see Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015). 
Technological Adoption Model extended by users’ vulnerability 
The adaptation and the use of new technologies presents a central challenge for
organisations and is a key research topic in the field of “Information Systems”. While
organisations invest a lot of money and effort on new technology, managers may not see
the [expected] increases in productivity. This may be due to lower rates of new
technology (Sichel, 1997), as employees fall back to old ways of working (especially
when they encounter difficulties). Given the increasing ubiquity of technology, user 
acceptance of it, needs further research. The Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 
1989; Davis, Bargozzi, and Warshaw, 1989) (TAM) makes substantial theoretical and 
empirical support to address this challenge. This model compares favourably with 
alternative models such as the Theories of Reasoned Action (TRA) and of Planned 
Behavior (TPH) (Venkatesh, 1999). TAM theorizes that an individual’s behavioural
intention to use a new technology is based on two different beliefs: the perceived 
usefulness and the perceived ease of use. While the perceived usefulness can be defined 
as the extent to which a person believes that using the new technology will improve his 
or her job performance, perceived ease of use describes the extent to which a person 
believes that using the new technology will not result in an increased effort. 
Several meta-analyses have demonstrated that TAM is a valid and powerful 
model. Lederer and colleagues (2000) for example proved the predictability of the
model for different technologies in their analysis of over fifteen studies over a period of
 
  
   
 
  








    
   
  
 
     
  
  
10 years (from 1989 to 1999). They looked at the relations between factors such as 
perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, attitude to use, and actual use of ICTs and 
were able to state that the model showed a high level of predictability. King and He
(2006) analysed eighty-eight different published studies that had used TAM and were 
able to confirm that the model can be used in a wide variety of contexts. Based on these
findings, we are convinced of TAM’s robustness and have adopted this model in our 
study. 
Understanding the relevance of social factors in technologically driven 
approaches, some scholars have already started to integrate trust into the TAM (e.g. 
Gefen, Karahanna, and Straub, 2003; Hsu and Lin, 2008; Alalwan, Baabdullah, Rana, 
Tamilmani, and Dwivedi, 2018). In this paper, we will build on this by (a) including
distrust and (b) focusing on the two components of distrust when it comes to the “non” 
use of new technologies, i.e. the negative expectations (cognitive side of distrust) and 
the unwillingness to become vulnerable (affective side of distrust). While research 
shows that users are not willing to invest time and effort using a new technology when 
they do not understand the benefit of it (perceived usefulness) or when they are
convinced that it is not easy to use (perceived ease of use), we also assume that potential
users are interested in the intended values of a new technology (e.g. perceived ethical 
acceptability, fairness). Users may compare these perceived values with their own 
values and check whether the two value systems are congruent. When users feel there is 
an incongruity they may not be willing to take on the responsibility for using a new 
technology, will not change their attitude towards it and may avoid any interaction with 
it. Figure 1 shows the theoretical framework of our approach, focusing on distrust. 
 
 
   
 
 





















Figure 1. Theoretical framework on distrust and TAM
Method
Sample 
Data was gathered during intensive cooperation with the LAs of six European cities and 
their wider stakeholders in the H2020 CIVITAS SUITS project. Supporting Urban 
Integrated Transport Systems (SUITS) is a four-year research and development project, 
aiming to increasing the capacity of small to medium cities to plan and implement 
sustainable mobility measures. The project addresses the ongoing major transformations 
in the transport sector which requires LAs to work in new ways, with new partners, 
regulations, new modes of transport and notably, with innovative technologies.
The new technologies we are referring to in this paper are defined under the
umbrella of ICTs. Within the transport sector, sensor technology captures traffic flows 
and data on air pollution in real time, intelligent information and support systems 
facilitate the search for parking spaces or simplify the use of public transport and 






     
  







   
  
   
behaviour and utilization rates that may inform the planning of future transport systems 
and more bespoke services LAs have to deal with such new technology. Even though 
the relevant technology is usually planned and implemented by the respective supplier, 
a precise understanding of the functionality, possibilities and limits of the technology is 
essential on the side of the local authority in order to formulate requirements within the 
planning process. It is the task of the organisation’s employees to operate the
corresponding systems for data visualization and evaluation. This technology was part 
of the interview and workshop discussions for example. 
The approach is to transfer learning from larger cities, to smaller ones, making
them more effective and resilient to change in the judicious implementation of 
sustainable transport measures. In the course of the project, the six cities of Kalamaria
(Greece), Valencia (Spain), Alba Iulia (Romania), Rome and Turin (Italy) and West 
Midlands (UK) have embarked on a change journey that involved, in part, the adoption 
of new technology. The adoption of the new technology was the subject of various 
workshops with city partners and in-depth semi-structured interviews, over 3 years, 
each lasting around one to two hours. Since research on distrust related to TAM is
missing so far, we decided to follow a qualitative approach in our study to best answer 
our research question and to gain in-depth explanations and understanding. As we
wanted to understand a very complex decision- making process in the local authorities’
transport planning departments and wider organisation, we decided to apply a
qualitative analysis approach as this kind of approach is often interlinked with complex
decisions as deviating nuances with respect to the diverse approaches (e.g. “Glaserian 
and Straussian versions of grounded theory”) are given which hamper comparative
decisions (Holloway and Todres 2003: 354). Our data sample mainly consists of the 
interview transcripts from 12 different representatives of the transport planning









    
 
  











departments from six LA partners. The participants were selected by the local 
authorities. As we worked with different sized LAs, in some cases the two 
representatives of a local authority constituted the whole transport planning 
department/team or at least 10% of it. Further, we paid attention to a balanced sample in 
relation to gender, age, tenure and management level.
Data collection
Semi structured interview were conducted in line with the recommendations by
Bryman, 1988; Buchanan, 1993). The interview questions were designed to allow the 
participants to interpret and describe their experiences and feeling when adopting new 
technology in their own way. The interview questions focussed on (1) trustworthiness 
and trust towards unknown technology; (2) previous experience with technology
adoption; and (3) their attitude and intention to use the proposed systems in their
workplace. Each participant was given the interview protocol one week prior to the
interview and all were well prepared to explain their views. At the start of the
interviews, the participants were asked to talk freely about the questions and to discuss 
them from their own experiences. All interviews were conducted in English either in the 
participants’ workplaces or during video conferences, and were audio recorded and 
transcribed in full.
Workshops have been previously used to integrate different types of information and 
bring multiple members – here of the transport planning departments from all local 
authorities together - to think through potential solutions for complex problems
(Huntington et al., 2002; Knapp et al., 2011). Such workshops have been shown to 
facilitate knowledge sharing and social learning, build trust, and increase participant 
understanding of the subject matter (Patel et al. 2007; Dreelin and Rose 2008). We used 




    
 













reduce the employees’ unwillingness to become vulnerable and to allow positive 
expectations to develop.  Each workshop, lasted around one day and was designed to 
provide many opportunities for feedback and discussion in both small and large groups. 
Small-group interaction has been suggested as an effective way to facilitate knowledge
sharing in workshops (Patel et al. 2007). These workshops represent the culmination of
three years of work collecting data in form of documentation of long-term qualitative 
knowledge. Throughout the project, researchers worked with the LAs on a regular basis, 
through biannual community research meetings, interviews, fieldwork, and participant 
observation. 
Data analysis 
The data gathered in the interviews and workshops has been used in two ways. Firstly, 
to understand the concerns and expectations of the participants when dealing with new
technologies. These insights were used to build models of trustful behaviour concerning
technology adoption. Secondly, we used the transcript material to provide short cases 
and quotes to enliven and illustrate the results and decision processes identified. 
The objective of the analysis was to examine the perspective of the different 
participants highlighting the similarities and differences and generating new insights, 
using a thematic analysis as suggested in the literature (Braun and Clarke, 2006; King, 
2004). Three main question have been used as a starting point: “do LAs’ employees feel 
vulnerable when new technology is implemented and have negative expectations 
towards this technology?” and if so, “what are the main issues that make those 
employees feeling vulnerable or having negative expectations?” and “what are the 
consequences of the unwillingness to become vulnerable and the negative expectations
in LAs?”.
 
   
  
    
  
  
    
    
   
    





   
  
 
   
 
 
An advantage of thematic analysis is that it can be widely used across a range of 
epistemologies and research questions (Nowell, Norris, White & Moules, 2017). It 
provides a systematic yet flexible approach to the analysis of qualitative data providing
rich and detailed account of data (Nowell et al., 2017). More specifically, theoretical 
thematic analysis has been used. Theoretical thematic analysis or deductive thematic
analysis are mainly driven by a specific theoretical framework and research question
chosen by the researcher (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Accordingly, the transcribed 
interviews were coded using an a priori codebook, developed from a rigorous literature
review on employees’ vulnerability when introducing new technology in organisations. 
The data analysis followed three main steps. The first step checked the existence
of actual unwillingness to become vulnerable. Therefore, the coding strategy has been 
driven by the first question, regarding whether employees feel or do not feel vulnerable
when adopting new technology. In this step, the literature about distrust, and more
specifically about vulnerability as a key element of distrust, was used to support the 
analysis of the interviews. The results provided support for a second step, which
consisted in the identification of the main indicators and consequences of the existence
of unwillingness to be vulnerable.
In this second stage, inductive thematic analysis was used to identify the reasons 
for employees’ feelings of vulnerability. To do this, codes were considered for distrust 
and trust as a belief and as a behaviour (Bijlsma-Frankema et al. 2015; Guo, Lumineau, 
and Lewicki, 2017), “trustworthiness” as well as ‘distrustworthiness’ (e.g. incompetent, 
self-interested, exploitative, volatile, opportunistic), and the “actual use of the new 
technology”. Data was coded at the explicit, rather than implicit, level, and results 
organised thematically, based on the patterns which emerged from the discourse
(Deacon, Pickering, Golding and Murdock 2007). In this way, we progressed from 
 
  
   
 
 
   
   
   
  
    
  











   
deductive ‘first-order codes’ to inductive ‘second-order themes’, guided as appropriate 
by coding (such as that listed above) and thematic terminology found in similar studies 
(e.g. Nienaber and Schewe, 2014; Rousseau et al.,1998; Searle and Patent, 2019). The
findings section describes the most frequently found themes in relation to our research 
aim and theoretical framework. 
The aim of the third step was the validation of the identified themes from the
interviews and the refinement of these though discussions in six workshops. All LAs
participated jointly in the first, third and fifth workshop. Workshop two and four were
each held three times, with each workshop having the participation of three LAs. The
workshops were conducted by two members of the research team, who produced a 
report for each workshop. The reports were analysed by a third member of the research 
team to establish a link between the workshop results and the results of the interviews. 
The objective of this approach was to increase the reliability of our results by using
methodological and researcher triangulation (e.g. Bryman, 2013). 
Using two coders to analyze our interview data necessitates establishing
interrater reliability. We checked for intercoder reliability by applying Krippendorff’s 
alpha (Krippendorff 2004) which is commonly used in content analysis to quantify the 
extent of agreement between raters, it differs from most other measures of interrater 
reliability because it calculates disagreement (as opposed to agreement). We achieved a
Krippendorff’s alpha of more than .900, which is very good (Krippendorff 2004). 
Results 
The first section of the results shows how we investigated whether employees’ 
vulnerability is actually present in the LAs (step 1 of the analysis). The second section 
will highlight the identified key aspects that foster unwillingness to become vulnerable 
and its negative consequences in the LAs when it comes to using new technologies
 
 
   






    
 
 
     
  
    
    
 
 
   
 
(here the sensor technologies which captures traffic flows and data on air pollution in 
real time, intelligent information and support systems that facilitate the search for
parking spaces or simplify the use of public transport and complementary micro-
mobility services) in the field of sustainable mobility planning.
Existence of employees’ unwillingness to become vulnerable
Scholars have highlighted several ways in which the existence of distrust, based on the 
unwillingness to become vulnerable, may show itself. These include wariness (Chang
and Fang 2013; Lewicki et al. 1998; Ou and Sia 2010), concern (McKnight, Kacmar
and Choudhury 2004), deception (Deutsch 1958), suspicion (Lewicki et al. 1998; 
Kramer 1996; Ou and Sia 2010; Deutsch 1958), or message questioning (Sitkin and 
Stickel 1996).
The participants made it very clear that most employees feel uncomfortable
using and adopting new technology they are not familiar with. Taking the idea of sense-
making theory into account, we can assume that such situations are perceived as “risky”
by employees and thus, may lead to negative feelings of not willing to become (or show 
themselves to be) vulnerable. This can be illustrated by a practical example from our 
work in the SUITS project. We noticed a lack of cooperation between a technology
supplier, who as part of the agreed research plan, required mobility datasets to be 
provided by the cities to iteratively develop the system. Key to this was that the supplier
could then understand what and how data was being collected, and develop different
types of visualisations to help the LAs to gain a better understanding of mobility
patterns in their city. 
The city partners had not seen the software before, but did not ask questions or 
support to understand its’ benefit when it was demonstrated. They only expressed 








   






    
  
    
 
for example was “I am not familiar with that tool and I do not see the benefit of it 
except that I have to invest time and effort” [LA 4, representative from transport 
planning department].
The service provider clearly demonstrated what he needed to make the new tool
running and kept his request for data simple, asking for “open data” in any format, of 
any size to remove the onus of reformatting data from the LAs. Theoretically all city
partners should have been able to deliver some data - without any obstacles in relation 
to confidentiality issues or technological skills. Instead this seemed to make them even 
more suspicious. They argued “We do not have the data; another department is 
responsible for this data; We do not know really what kind of data is required”. 
After two years, some partners kept arguing that the requested data would not be 
available and that they did not know whether their data format would work for the new 
technology. Such statements are indicators for employee’s vulnerability as it seems 
employees try to find excuses to hide their own unwillingness to share data with 
someone outside the organisation (e.g. afraid of the negative consequences of it such as 
negative publicity in the city; increased workload). The reluctance on the part of public
authorities to share data can also be explained through their concerns over data security
and privacy in general, and GDPR in particular. This was introduced at the start of data 
sharing discussions and no one was entirely sure of the system, and certainly did not
want to jeopardize their organizations by providing data in contravention to GDPR. 
Additionally, the participants indicated concerns about the supplier’s motives. 
They could not understand a business model in which the supplier offered services
without payment. Indeed, the service provider was just interested in providing a test for
demonstration purposes, to get testimonials, increase its’ reputation and further research 




   
    
     
    
   
   
 






   
  




Based on this example it seems, that not just the technology has to be perceived 
as trustworthy, but also the supplier behind the technology.
Several hints for distrust indicate the existence of the unwillingness of employees to 
become vulnerable when using a new technology, such as:
“I [LA 6 representative] am concerned what they will do with the data in the 
long run and thus, I do not want to provide data for this tool.” 
“they do not really care about how we [employees’ of LA 4, transport planning
department] feel or what such a technology means to us”
“I [LA 3 representative of the transport planning department] do not belief in 
what they tell us, I am questioning the benefit of the tool [data analysis tool]”
“We told them [supplier] several times that we do not know what kind of data 
they want, so we are not willing anymore to ask again [LA 1 representative]
Table 1. Hints for the existence of the unwillingness to become vulnerable
Many of the comments occurred during the introduction of GDPR and also at a time of 
major security breaches and misuse of data, so although they occurred within the 
context of transport data, they are representative of the feelings of many employees and 
organisations in the late 1990s.
Afterwards we undertook thematic analysis (step 2). Based on the results we
adopted our extended TAM by adding (1) indicators that may raise the likelihood of 
employees’ unwillingness to actually use new technology and that demonstrate that 
employees will not adopt the new technology in the long-run. These indicators will help 
senior management to recognize at a very early stage that an implementation may fail
and help them to be proactive in reducing the likelihood of a failure. 




     
 
   
  
  





     
     






(1) will help to avoid the development of an employee’s unwillingness to become 
vulnerable and thus, prevent the development of obstacles that will hinder the 
actual use of a new technology. 
(2) will give hints to the management that their employees’ will very likely not use
the new technologies.
Key indicators for employees’ feeling actual vulnerability in LAs
From our results the following indicators could be identified that increase the likelihood 
of the existence of distrust when focusing in particular on the users’ unwillingness to 
become vulnerable.
Perceived uselessness and uneasiness of use. In line with previous research, working
with the LAs has provided evidence that perceived uselessness or usefulness as well as 
the estimated amount of effort that it will take to get familiar with the new technology,
are decisive factors in deciding to use a technology or not. Both indicators are aligned to 
the new technology itself and the positive expectations a potential user may have. Both 
factors relate to the cognitive dimension - is this new technology worthy to be trusted?
While these merely support the TAM, we want to highlight two additional indicators: 
perceived value incongruence and negative attribution towards motives. 
Perceived value incongruence. Perceived value incongruence has been defined as the 
belief that others adhere to values that are perceived as incompatible their own core
values (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015). Thus, when an individual identifies that their
own values are not compatible with the values of someone or something else, the 
unwillingness to become vulnerable emerges. Perceived value incongruence has been 
proposed as a determinant of negative perceptions and expectations of the trustee’s 




     
     
       
   
  
   
 
  
   
      
   
  
   
     
 
    
    
  
understanding of vulnerability as exposure to contingencies and stress, and difficulty in 
coping with them, we can see that a perceived value incongruence stresses an individual 
as the individual feels a lack of means to cope without damaging loss. This was 
observed in our sample: the majority of our city partners failed to explain their
particular technological requirements due to their lack of technological expertise. The
supplier may perceive such behaviour as an unwillingness to become vulnerable. 
As a result, the supplier could not tailor the offering to the real needs of the LA. 
Instead he could only supply generic, off the shelf solutions or made assumptions of
needs based on prior experience. This further reinforced the employee’s unwillingness 
to become vulnerable (e.g. increased scepticism of the suppliers’ intensions in general)
and fostered negative expectations such as “the supplier does not really care about us
[as LA]. They just want to sell their product.” [LA 3, representative of the transport 
planning department]. 
The next example also shows the negative circle of a perceived value 
incongruence. During the SUITS project, two technology suppliers tried to convince
partners from the LAs to share data with them to test more efficient ways handling of
big data – which would in fact be a large benefit to all small LAs who lack the 
computational capacity to process large amounts of data. However, the unwillingness of 
the LAs to share the data was driven by different underlying value systems among the 
involved parties. The LAs could not understand the reasons and benefits of the new 
technology for which they were asked to provide data, given that they had some systems 
in place already. The benefits of the new systems were not sufficiently explained, so 
they were not able to recognize the advantages of the new solution for their future
needs. Additionally, new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into force
during discussions about data transfer. This complicated the whole process for several 














    
   




months. Everyone was vulnerable, as it was not clear which data could be shared by
whom and for what purpose. Legacy mobility data has not been collected systemically
within and across LAs. Data may be collected in an ad hoc, non-standardised way to 
provide evidence for new transport infrastructures, or it may be collected as part of
projects. Once the project is over, the data remains. It is potentially a useful source of 
data to ‘experiment with’ e.g. to show how it can be visualised or merged with other 
data sets. However, uncovering this data, finding out who owns it, and how it could be
used is a daunting challenge, especially if it places an organisation in violation of
GDPR. So, even though LAs had a lot of data, and will need to handle more data in the 
future they did not feel secure enough to hand over current data without a Data 
Management Plan. This put them in a position of vulnerability with respect to the
technology providers. 
Project trials in Kalamaria in which real-time mobility data was collected 
showed the need for a lot of post processing to ensure anonymization of data collected 
automatically for vehicles. Lacking the skills to do this, and knowing it is now required,
could be an added perceived vulnerability for the LAs especially with the introduction 
of fines for organisations found to be in breach of GDPR.
Additionally, the cities raised concerns regarding the confidentiality of their data 
and the long-term use of the data once it is passed to a private company. One statement 
was for example “We expect that we have little in common with the others and the 
others intentions may different to ours in the long run. Maybe that can harm us 
sometime.” [LA 2, representative of the transport planning department]. 
The LAs have a responsibility for the data they collect, and for the citizens who 
provide that data. Even in cases where anonymised data can be used to help develop 




   






      
    
   
       
 
  
    
  
to be characterized as unpredictable and threatening, thus fostering a sense of 
uncertainty and vulnerability (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Although research shows that low 
levels of distrust are healthy and prevent individuals to make failures or trust “blindly”, 
the indicated level of wariness was relatively high (e.g. Lewicki et al., 1998) and thus, 
not healthy anymore.
Attribution of negative motive. The attribution of negative motives can also be an 
indicator for distrust. Attribution is the process through which people try to explain their
own and others’ behaviours (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Heider, 1958; 
Kelley, 1967). The proposed relation between the unwillingness to become vulnerable 
and motivational attributions is built on the notion that individuals feel the urge to 
interpret behaviours of others that are salient to oneself, such as harmful behaviours. 
Our data indicated several aspects that may be summarized as attributions of negative
motives. Negative experiences with new technologies in the past foster such 
attributions. A once failed new technology will thus increase the attributions of negative
motives and foster distrust towards innovations. Several participants referred to such 
negative experiences.
In some cases, a technological solution has been poorly developed and not 
sufficiently adapted to the user needs or the technology had been poorly introduced to 
the employees by senior management. When employees do not understand the benefits
of a new technology or its benefit for the city and the citizens, they create negative
motives (based on poor past experiences) and develop an unwillingness to become 
vulnerable: “I do not really understand how this should help us and how we can benefit 
from it. Thus, what are the motives behind the introduction of this technology in our 
department?” [LA 2, representative of the transport planning department]. In some




    





   
     
    
    
  
        
    
       
   
  





   
back to the old ways of working. Such negative experiences can strengthen the 
attributions of negative motives in the future and increase the likelihood that the
unwillingness to become vulnerable emerges when it comes to the implementation of
new technologies. Another example also provided evidence on the negative attribution
towards motives. The majority of LAs avoided interaction with a service provider who 
offered a new tool to forecast air pollution or traffic peaks because they did not believe
the suppliers’ business model. The supplier offered its’ service voluntary which the LAs 
perceived as less trustworthy as they suspected negative motives behind this model. 
Table 2 summarizes some key examples from the interview and workshop data 
in line with the two identified indicators that increase the likelihood that users’ may not 
want to become vulnerable and thus, do not use a new technology in the long-run. 
Several hints for perceived value incongruence
“I [LA 4 representative of the transport planning department] rather question
whether this technology really works for us, you know, our LA is very
traditional and citizens expect us to take responsibility for taking care of them
[concerns when it comes to the use of e-skaters]” 
“They [supplier] do not really listen to what we tell them – we provided them a 
lot of information but actually they did not come back to us – so I assume we are 
not on the same page” [employee of LA 3, transport planning department]
“We expect that we have little in common with the other and that the others
intentions are different to ours in the long run. Maybe that can harm us 
sometime.”[LA 2, representative of the transport planning department].”
Several hints for the attribution of negative motive
“I do not really understand how this should help us and how we can benefit from
it. Thus, what are the motives behind the introduction of this technology in our




   
   
 







    
   
    
  
 
    
    
 
“they work for their own interest, they want to sell that technology, they are 
supportive now, as long as we show interest” [LA3, representative of the 
transport planning department]
Table 2. Indicators for an increased likelihood for the unwillingness to become 
vulnerable 
Negative consequences of the unwillingness to become vulnerable in LAs
Two key indicative behaviours can be spotted when individuals do not want to use a
new technology:
Avoidance of interaction. One of the key outcomes of the interviews has been 
evidence of avoidance of interaction – in particular some employee’s tried to avoid 
interacting with the new technology at all. This finding is in line with those in trust 
research (e.g. Bies & Tripp, 1996; Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004; March & Olsen, 1975). 
The interviewees referred to several examples that fostered their unwillingness to 
become vulnerable and thus, led to distrust towards new technologies. For example, 
when employees have been previously disappointed when their positive expectations
towards new technologies were not fulfilled, they then became sceptical and tried to 
avoid interaction with it and the whole implementation process. “We tried not to be
involved with the senior management that wanted us to test the new technology. You 
know last time we put so much effort in it and I still do not see the benefit for us.” [LA 
1, representative of the mobility planning department]. Interestingly, in the end this may
make them more vulnerable if their attitudes and behaviours are not shared by the rest 
of the organisation. These employees may become late adopters (shifting from early
adopters to late adopters) or avoid adoption altogether, perhaps resulting in less 
employee satisfaction and reduced performance. 
   
   
  
   
   
   





   
  
   
 
   
   
 
   




However, a new technology cannot be implemented by senior management alone as 
then the implementation is likely to fail. The top-down approach only works if it gets 
bottom-up support by the wider group of employees or stakeholders. For example, in 
our research, the city of Alba Iulia implemented new guidelines for municipal 
procurement, but without trust, this new process could not have been implemented. The
transport and procurement departments worked closely together with an external 
supplier and were willing to become vulnerable towards each other – meaning they trust 
each other that no one will behave opportunistic - they were empowered to implement 
these guidelines successfully. 
Knowledge hiding. Another negative consequence of the unwillingness to become 
vulnerable is an identified lack of knowledge sharing, mentioned by several LAs. West 
Midlands Combined Authority, a partner in the SUITS project, put this point on the top 
of their agenda as it is fundamental for organizational performance.
US organizations spend for example almost a trillion dollars annually to analyse, 
store, and retrieve knowledge (Lohr, 2002). The willingness of employees to share
knowledge depends on the level of trust employees have with their organization, 
colleagues or other stakeholders (e.g. McAllister, 1995; Schewe and Nienaber, 2011). 
While technology is able to store explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge resides only in 
the minds of people and its availability to others depends upon individual decisions and 
behaviours (Nienaber and Schewe, 2011). Thus, when employees start to distrust a new 
technology, they are not willing to share their positive experiences with that technology, 
or their learnings and may start to talk very negatively about it. These aspects are very
important for the future developments of new technologies.
Even worse is the negative culture that may evolve from the unwillingness to 







    
   
  
   
    
   
  
    
 
     
  
   
 
    
   
  
 
organisation and become less motivated which leads to lower levels of organizational 
performance (Nienaber, Romeike, Searle, and Schewe, 2015). 
Table 3 summarizes some key examples for the two key consequences that follow the
unwillingness of employees to become vulnerable. 
Several hints for avoidance of interaction
“I am not really willing to provide any data. I am not sure what they will do with 
it in the future and thus, it is maybe better not to share anything.” [LA 2, 
representative of the transport planning department]
“We do not really meet each other as you know. Maybe we share not the same 
view.” [LA 1, representative of the mobility department]
“They always decide, so why should I try to ask them or provide feedback?” 
[LA 3, representative of the transport planning department]
Several hints for knowledge hiding 
“I do not tell everything, sometimes I just think, you never know, maybe you 
need that information later […] and then it brings you in a better position [LA 1, 
representative of the mobility department].” 
“They do not tell us, so why should I tell” [LA 5, representative of the transport
planning department]
“In the end I told them but actually I do not tell everything, I mean for example 
we had some trouble with the technology once but we did not tell as you know
then we are the stupid guys in the end, so we did not say anything and then yeah
the implementation really failed. We all knew why… but nobody wanted to be 
guilty.” [LA 6, representative of the transport department]
Table 3. Negative consequences of the unwillingness to become vulnerable
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Figure 2. Extended and adopted framework on TAM distrust 
Guidelines 
The following section highlights the most important guidelines to avoid the emergence
of unwillingness to become vulnerable and to cope with existent distrust. Herewith we
want to support any organisation wishing to implement a new technology and as a
result, change the working practices of its employees. The following guidelines will 
help senior management to recognize issues around the ‘human factors’ which may
impede technological innovation at a very early stage to help them to be proactive in 
reducing the likelihood of a failure. 
Avoid the emergence of distrust 
Identify the sources of distrust. Our results highlighted that distrust can have several 
sources or referents. While employees may distrust a new technology, they can also 
distrust the supplier and their motivations. If senior managers want to reduce the 
likelihood that distrust emerges when new technologies are implemented, they first have
to understand what employees distrust and to what or whom they are not willing to 
   
 
   





    
  




   
  
  
   
  
   
 
  
become vulnerable in this context, e.g. is it the technology itself, the reputation of the 
supplier or brand. Furthermore, senior managers have to take into account that spill over 
effects from one source or referent to another are likely as distrust is pervasive 
(Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015), meaning that when individuals distrust a particular
supplier (or decision maker), they will also distrust any technology associated with that 
supplier. 
Be aware of the users’ values. When fostering the actual use of new technologies, it is 
important to understand a user’s values before trying to make him or her use it. It was 
important to understand the organisations’ values first, as the individuals in the 
organisation will match their values with those of the new technology to see whether
they are congruent with each other or not. Thus, when a new technology shows values 
that are not congruent with the user’s values, usage will not happen. This means, senior
management has to understand whether their employees’ values (as in the person-
organisation-fit approach (e.g. O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell, 1991) are in line with 
those of the organisation to ensure the success of a technological implementation 
process. When a mismatch exists between the technology and the organisational climate 
the likelihood is relatively high that the implementation will fail. 
Create a guiding coalition within the organisation that serves as role model. A 
guiding coalition should comprise individuals that can be characterized as early
adopters, have had previous positive experiences with new technology, and are also 
aware of negative consequences and potential obstacles to implementation. They should
be well informed about the solution, have influential relationships with people at 
different levels of the organisations, be trusted by most and well respected for their 
competencies and come from diverse sections/represent different groups who will be




   
  
   
  
 
    




   
   
   
 
  
   
   
 
of more junior staff members, with high technical open-mindedness, who can help to 
motivate others and can serve as connectors for the younger and more diverse
employees. 
Transparent and honest communication. One learning from our work during SUITS
has been the fact that senior management has to be very transparent when informing
their employees of a new technology implementation. They also have to refer to 
potential obstacles and risks. They have to be honest about their concerns regarding the 
new technology. The literature shows that openness and honesty in communication 
helps employees trust in something they are not familiar with (Nienaber and Schewe, 
2014). Furthermore, to show that for example expert knowledge is missing at senior 
levels, management may also motivate individuals to become indirectly part of the
“guiding-coalition”, offering their experiences and skills to help the senior management. 
This will make such individuals to feel as real part of the whole implementation process 
and motivate them to function as role models for their colleagues in the organisation. 
Cope with the unwillingness to become vulnerable 
Avoid increase of top-down monitoring. According to the threat-rigidity theory when 
responding to demanding or crisis situations, organisations often constrain 
communication and assert more control, which ultimately makes them less flexible
(Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981). Senior management may increase monitoring
mechanisms if they feel that something is not working the way they intended, to 
understand what is happening. However, the trust-control literature demonstrates very
clearly that most control mechanisms reduce the willingness to become vulnerable 
instead of increasing it (for an overview e.g. Long and Weibel, 2018; Bijlsma-Frankema
and Costa, 2005). While Long and Sitkin (2006) emphasizes that formal controls can 
 
   
  
 
    
  





   
    
  
 
    
   
 
 
   
foster trust when they reduce perceived levels of risk and uncertainty, or prevent 
authorities from encroaching on their personal freedom the majority of control 
mechanisms will lead to the opposite results (e.g. Long & Weibel, 2018). Close 
monitoring has been proven to foster distrust. Thus, even when the senior management
recognizes that the likelihood for an implementation failure has increased, they have to 
avoid the implementation of micro-control mechanisms such as closer monitoring.
Face-to-face communication. Meeting face-to-face with those distrustful of the new 
technology may allow trust to emerge between the negotiating parties (individual level) 
which may in turn transfer to trust in the technology (human-technological level). It was 
said in the interview that face-to-face meetings are the best way to develop a trustful 
relationship with each other that will affect future decision-making. Face-to-face
communication can mitigate the effects of perceived organisational rigidity, especially
the ones resulting from the decreased quality of communication that characterises rigid 
organisations.
Get a third party on board. In order to address issues of developing trusting
relationships within organisations, it may be helpful to gain external support from 
former suppliers or experts when implementation decisions have to be made. A third 
party could talk about experiences in the past and address particular concerns of the new 
technology from another perspective as the senior management or provider of the
technology. Users may perceive those persons or institutions as “independent” and thus, 
be more likely to trust them. They can serve as mentor or mediator and help to
overcome distrust towards the new technology and make individuals actual use it. Based 
on our results we can say that an educational institution or an individual dealing with 
similar technologies could serve as third party as these institutions and individuals are
perceived usually as independent – different as consultancies.  
  
   
 
  







   
 




This paper highlights the relevance of the employees’ (users’) willingness to become 
vulnerable when new technologies are implemented in LAs (organisations). As long as 
employees are not willing to become vulnerable when adopting a new technology and 
expect the new technology to be harmful, their introduction will be problematic. Based 
on comprehensive transcript material of interviews and workshops during the project 
SUITS, we are able to contribute decisively to existent research on TAM and trust by
firstly, focusing on distrust and secondly, by shedding light on the users’ unwillingness 
to become vulnerable when using a new technology. We show two indicators for 
increasing the likelihood of non-use besides the perceived uneasiness of use and 
uselessness, i.e. incongruence of values and negative attributions towards motives. Both 
are decisive in implementing a new technology successfully. Furthermore, we show two 
behaviours that indicate the existence of distrust while implementing a new technology: 
a lack of knowledge sharing and the avoidance of interaction. Finally, we are able to 
provide practical guidelines to avoid the emerging of an unwillingness to become 
vulnerable which path the way to a successful introduction of a new technology in an 
organisation. 
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